religiously important? Let me come at this question by acknowledging a need to offer a word on behalf of the second stonemason--or lawyer. Islamic scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr attributes to the Prophet Muhammed the thought (which I believe finds resonance in the Jewish and Christian traditions as well) that ''when a man works to feed his family he is performing as much an act of worship as if he were praying."4 By now, the idea is hardly new that almost any work may be a vocation or calling, may have religious importance. 5 The "religious connotation"6 of the work is there to be perceived and acted upon, and the task of seeing past the inevitable encrustations of work-a-day life is perhaps no less challenging for masons than for lawyers. Perhaps it is also no less achievable either, at least at times, for a mason building an office tower than a cathedral, or for a lawyer drafting an opinion letter in a loan application than a brief in a major civil-liberties suit.
Understanding the religious significance of working to feed one's family infuses it with meaning, for it makes of work the beginning of the assumption of responsibility for the well-being of another-but only the beginning, for the focus is still on material well-being and on those "others" closest to the worker. Indeed, this understanding complicates the task of deciding how one is to go about one's work, for commitment to the material well-being of one's family is a moral hazard as well, with the potential for blinding one to the moral significance of the costs that decisions made in work (better to "feed one's family'') may impose on others. By contrast, the third mason, and Shaffer's lawyer, open themselves to both the deeper meaning and the lurking greater complexity of work. By understanding that its religious significance inheres in the manner in which work is carried on and in the radiating consequences of its compietion-a cathedrai, a business financing, a major civil-liberties decision-the third worker acknowledges responsibility for its effects on a community that extends far beyond one's family, and may recognize as well that what one's family (especially children) needs goes far beyond material sustenance. 7 In moving toward this broader vision, the question that might first come to mind may be termed a substantive one: How does an awareness 4 . Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam 98 ( 1967). 5 . For a concise discussion of the evolution of the meaning of the words, vocation and calling, see Allegretti, The lAwyer's Calling, supra n. 3, at 27-32.
JOURNAL OF LAW & REUGJON
[Vol.XVill of religious significance change what we do and don't do in our work? One answer to this question is that this awareness sets limits on what we will do or decline to do in our professional life. Much of the writing to date of the "religious lawyering movement" seeks to illustrate or claim legitimacy or respect for such limits. It is advocacy by or on behalf of assertedly religious lawyers, addressed to the law itself, making a claim on that law as manifested in the governing norms of professional responsibility. 8 Shaffer's deeper, more far-reaching challenge is directed not to the law but to religious lawyers themselves. He poses a "procedural" question, one that bas the power to reorient our professional lives and the role of "professional guidance" within them: Where do we turn for . guidance in answering what I have called the substantive question? His response: "Called out of the church" as we are to enter the practice of law, it is there we return for guidance in carrying it on.
[T]he lawyer stands in the community of the faithful and looks from there at the law . . . . When the study or practice of law becomes pa inful or confusing for her, she returns to the community of the faithful, and talks there, in that religious community, about her professional life.9
It is the meaning and significance of this response that I propose to examine here.10 a. 1 have examined the legal question that arises when religiously grounded limits and profess ionally grounded norms dircc dy conflict, in Lesnick, 1M Religious lAwyer, supra n. 3. The specifiC context there was the ass ignment of an attorney, conscientiously opposed to abortion on religious grounds, to represent a minor seeking a judicial "bypass .. or parental consent to an abortion.
9. Shaffer, Faithfol CommUIIity, supra n. 2, at 198.
I 0. It is important to note two observations about the boundaries of this essa y.
First, I focus more on the implications of Shaffer's fundamental stance. looking at the profess ion from within the lawyer's community of faith, than on the merits of an initial decision to take that approach. lack Sammons is perhaps the leading proponent of the polar stance, seeking to articulate and apply norms that are to be round within the practice of law itself. For the most recent and most fully articulated sratement of his view, see lack L. Sammons, "Cheater! .. : 11te Ctt ntral Moral AdmonltiOII of Legal Ethla, Games, Lu.sory Attitudes. Internal PenpectiiiU, and Justice, 39 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (2003) . It hardly rebuts his position for inc to acknowledge that it bespeaks a faith in the moral resources of the legal profess ion that l no longer can muster.
Second, it should be borne in mind that the following discussion deals only with the state of mind with which a lawyer approaches a client. The action that the lawyer ultimately takes depends also on the resulting lawyer-client interaction. For some of Shaffer's thoughts on the "moral conversation" between lawyer and client, see Shaffer, Simon, 8Jlflra n. 2; Shaff er, Human Nature. supra n. 2. For other thought-provoking discussions of this difficult question, see e.g. Robert E. Rodes Confession. anti the Counselor-ai-I.Aw: Lessons "Church" is Shaffer's short-hand Christian tenn for this community of the faithful, but he does not mean by it his institutional Roman Catholic Church, whether his Bishop, pastor or parish. First, he insists, "any reservation of the responsibility for moral discermnent to a specialist must be challenged, . . . especially if that specialist is understood to hold authority partly because he is one of a category of persons separated from the life-situations of people making moral choices."11 His parish congregation, too, falls short; it "gathers for worship on weekends, and once in a while for a picnic or a fish fry. It does not gather for moral deliberation."12 It is only in congregations of "fundamentalists, Pentecostals, Orthodox Jews, and Anabaptists" that the members are likely to be "sufficiently isolated by choice or circumstance" for Shaffer to be able to "suppose" that "the worshiping community and the deliberating community are routinely the same. " 13 Shaffer has found "church" in a Presbyterian Sunday School class, with "the sister and brother Christians with whom I prayed, broke bread, cried and argued."14 He has found it among "the circle of believers I live and work with, some close by, some who talk to me on the telephone or in letters, who take seriously the enterprise of being Jews or Christians in the American legal profession.
nlS He has found it in "a circumstantial group of believers on a university faculty-in somebody's office, in the hall, on a walk outside, or at lunch,"16 and also, I believe, in the group of faculty and student colleagues with whom he practices law in the Notre Dame legal aid clinic.17 "Believers," it seems evident from his examples, need only be people of faith, not necessarily members of a specific congregation or even of the same religious tradition. The presence of a religious [Vol. XVIII congregation is neither sufficient nor necessary to provide a "church" in the present context, for Shaffer's church is a gathering of people defined not by its ecclesial standing, but by its conception of its task. What is required is, and is only, that "questions of priority and behavior are resolved in discussion," in a manner that gives the participants warrant to believe that the Holy Spirit sat with them and joined in.18 What are the characteristics of participation in Shaffer's "churchly'' processes of ethical discernment? Shaped though they are by the particularity of his religious consciousness, the first, and the most fundamental, characteristic is one that would apply to virtually any religiously based approach: The processes and outcomes of moral deliberation, grounded as they are in the sovereignty of God, have priority over those of the profession. " [We] talk about the government as a problem for faith, rather than faith as a problem for governmene'19 Shaffer quotes a 19th Century Lithuanian Rabbi-"Israel was created to be an illumination unto the nations"-and adds: "Not to learn society's lessons, but to teach other lessons to itself and to 'society. "'20 Learning
professional responsibility, what we all learned and some of us teach, moves us (in Sandy Levinson's words) toward "the creati�n, by virtue of professional education, of almost purely fungible members of the respective professional community."21 To Shaffer, such a practice is "[a] pernicious form of corruption," a "familiar complex of pretenses."22
It is essential to bear in mind what tends to fade into the background in Shaffer's discussion, focused as it is on particular moments "when the study or practice of law becomes painful or confusing:"23 The consciousness of "religious importance" in law practice, of being "called out of the Church" to become a lawyer, affects one's stance toward lawyers' work in its entirety, not merely one's search for ethical discernment in problem sit1.1ations. Indeed, specific searches are grounded and oriented by the more fundamental infusion of meaning that is enabled by the recognition that, in the words of Shaffer's long-time colleague Robert Rodes, "we are all put here to love and serve." 2 4 The experience of meaninglessness, laying so heavily on many lawyers today, is (hopefully) transformed by this reorientation. 2 5 A second distinguishing characteristic of "churchly'' moral discernment is that it is inescapably communal. Shaffer is at his most energetically critical of the legal profession when he engages the deep seated individualism of our contemporary culture. "Our students," he observes, "however sensitive and well meaning, are captives of an ethic that leaves each of them ... morally alone; each of them as her own moral tyrant; each of them ... a captive of the Enlightenment's exaltation of abstract masculine reason." 2 6 Shaffer quotes liberation theologian Gustavo Gutierr ez: "[T]he following of Jesus always supposes membership in the assembly, the ecclesia. The following is ... a personal, free decision on my part, but I cannot live it out except in a community!m "It is not biblically sufficient," Shaffer asserts, "for a believer to go off by himself, alone with God, and figure out how his faith is to be reconciled with what he works at, or how his faith is to inform what he does when he works. " 2 8
While to some degree the communal quality of religiously grounded moral discernment seems inherent in a religious world-view, it is an outlook particularly expressive of a Roman Catholic, and perhaps also a Jewish, outlook. There are certainly religious traditions in which a "believer alone with God," at least when he or she is accompanied by Scripture, is not a self-contradiction.
More seriously, Shaffer's juxtaposition of an insistence on the communal aspect of religiously ground moral discernment, with his willingness to admit that shifting groups of individuals of diverse religious commitments and affiliations can act as "church," gives rise to an important latent difficulty, which I [Vol. xvm will address below.
Shaffer's conception of religiously grounded decisionmaking bas a third aspect that, while it is in no way idiosyncratic, is often not linked with the emphasis on communal discernment that be insists upon. For, to Shaffer, process bas a priority over outcome, and decisionmaking is relational rather than hierarcbical.29 Recognition of divine sovereignty gives rise to a teaching rather than a governing model. What goes on in Shaffer's church is that we "sit down together and think things out;"30 "what is important to communal discernment, after one assumes the presence of God in the discussion, is that everyone be allowed to speak, and that everybody else feel bound to pay attention."31 The answers given are "not inevitable" and "only provisiona1."32 No "specialist" bas authority. 33 It is this principle, I believe, that leads Shaffer to adopt what I have termed his fluid concept of"cburcb."
This lack of emphasis on answers and on the authority of text or cleric is uncongenial in contemporary America. Our culture-most emphatically including our legal culture-wants always to know which side is the "winner" (here, bas the winning moral argument), and the "command-and-obey'' approach to religion is ready at band to believers and skeptics alike. Yet, Shaffer, while insisting that ethical questions are preeminently religious and that religious discernment is preeminently communal rather than individualist, rejects authoritarian religion and emphasizes a search for ethical discernment that seems almost unconcerned with its outcome. This stance, congenial as I find it,34 is counter-intuitive for many.
Shaffer doesn't even say a great deal about what considerations should go into the process of ethical discernment-in lawyers' terms, 29 what "factors" are "relevant." I have learned much from some two decades of involvement in Quaker practice, where the primary route to moral discernment is silence.35 So to me his emphasis seems to give cognition an appropriate place: After all, with his Sunday School classmates he "prayed, broke bread, cried and argued!" More seriously, prayer, tears, and table fellowship have without question proven themselves sound routes to moral discernment in the experience of many, and at bottom I believe that Shaffer's espousal of a process orientation is not so much a product of analytical engagement as of his experience. 36
In admitting to his "circle of believers" those of differing faith traditions, and emphasizing "discussion" as the primary way to cany on moral discernment, Shaffer may appear to discount the importance of participating in regular religious practice.
To "take seriously" the profession of a religious identity may require ongoing participation in the practices expressive of that identity. 37 Milner Ball makes the point powerfully, in the language of his own tradition: "Exactly how does a believer receive community guidance in how faith is realized in work? Isn't it by hearing the Word preached and participating in the sacraments"?38 Even mere "discussion" is something more-becomes a practice-when carri ed on with the possibilities, and within the constraints, of the language of a specific faith tradition. The shared belief of a tradition, James Boyd White observes, is "not so much belief in the propositions asserted ... , but belief in the value, actuality, presence, vitality, and reality of the conversation-belief that this is the right way to talk."'9 Shaffer's writings, addressed as they are to readers 35 . For a brief account of my experience in that regard, see id. at 91-92. Quaker silence, it hardly need be said, is "not the mere outv."ard silence of the lips," but a challengins active practice requiring "a deep quietness of heart and mind, a laying aside of all preoccupation with pass ing things." Caroline Stephen, as quoted in Daniel A. Seeger, Silence: Our Eye on Etemity 8 (Pendle Hill Pamphlet No. 318, Dec. 1994 ). It is, moreover, primarily a communal act, with the Meeting an essential participant in an individual's discernment, though no words be exchanged. 36 . Some two decades ago. I ventured to defend a willinaness to admit tears, prayers, and even anger in argument, into thinking about legal questions, but on the mther limited ground that they in fact played a pan in the lives and minds of the pcophJ who brought "legal questions" to lawyers. Howard Lesnick. Legal Education's Concem with Jw:stice: A Conversation with a Critic, 35 J. Leg. Educ. 414,418 (1985) . I did not then acknowledge the role that those nonrational acts properly play in the fonna tion of our own moral judgments u lawyers. Set of secular professional journals, can be seen as regarding the ongoing religious practice of a person seeking moral guidance as no more than background to the concrete search for moral guidance in a discrete situation.
It is important not to hold this concern too tightly. Shaffer's tum to a fluid "church" is largely, I believe, a response to his dissatisfaction with much of the contemporary religious landscape. In turning to ad hoc assemblies of believers drawn from various traditions, he has focused on what its members have rather than what they lack, recognizing that it may be more salient that a community of moral discernment "take[s] seriously the enterprise ofbeing Jews or Christians in the American legal profession't40 than that it professes a single faith tradition.
In actuality, the members of a Shafferian "discerning community," even if constituted ad hoc, will often share a faith tradition, or find significant commonalities in their (partially) differing traditions.
In such cases they may tum naturally to specific practices through which moral discernment takes on a religious character. What is lost in coherence may be offset by the gain in spirit. Shaffer's taciturnity about the outcomes and the specifics of the processes of religiously grounded moral inquiry should not obscure the fact that the inquiry is inherently not neutral. One of his articles, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order,41 underscores that reality: While lawyers and the law itself incline toward "the social, political, and economic opinions of those we serve ... the wealthy and powerful,"42 the religious community of which he writes, rooted in "[ c ]are for the oppressed,'143 is an "alien and unsettled community," "disturbed and disturbing," yet "gifted with enduring certainty't44 -a sure prescription for subversion! Yet, as is all too well known, religion has functioned as much to bolster as to subvert "legal order;,..s and the presence of an institutional church is no more sufficient than it is necessary to meet Howard Lesnick). 
40.

Sh affer's criteria of a proper locus of moral discemment. 4 6
It should occasion no sutprise, therefore, to observe that, grounded though Shaffer's approach is in his Roman Catholic tradition, it can operate subversively against Catholic doctrines themselves. Shaffer recounts a telling example from the "advance directives" practice of the Notre Dame legal aid clinic. Faculty colleagues had argued "it is immoral for our office to prepare documents that might be used to disconnect artificially provided food and water from a healthy person. ' ,.. 7 The issue bas generated countless articles and conferences. Nonetheless:
Lawyers who read what the judges and the "thinkers" say about it . . . and then talk to an elderly widow who is deeply persuaded that she does not want "the tubes" inserted in her body when she is dying . . . The call of faith is experienced through the concrete reality of a student's encounter with the moral dimension of his or her work on behalf of a specific person (the client), and that exferience may trump the generalizations of a received religious tradition.4 46. A sympathetic critic has eloquently dc::sc ri. bcd the problem in these terms:
[The] attempt to describe the "community of the faithful .. as a body of resident aliens is as theologically necessary as it is sociologically suspect. Skeptical, pragmatic, suceess ful, indiYidualistic, secular America showa up ia church on Sunday morning. Lawyers show up, blissfully unaware that they have entered a closed-off, alternative polity.
These facts do not invalidate Shaffer's project. (To the contrary: they make i t more urgent!) But they mean he will hav e a tough time getting a hearing. For his believer lawyers will first bave to learn to become the strangers, "minorities," and "Others" that Moses' God requires them to be [Vol. XVIII Shaffer's emphasis on process should not, however, be misread as an invitation to moral lassitude or to easy rationalization of the call of self-interest. We are used to what I might tenn a '�urisdictional" approach to ethical decisionmaking. Some acts are forbidden, such as commingling client funds; some acts are required, for example, disclosing client perjury after unsuccessful attempts at remonstrance.
These are in the zone of law. 50 The middle zone-where we "may" rather than "shall" or "shall not"-is outside that zone, and is for the most part met with professional silence. A lawyer, according to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, is to be "guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers," through the "exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment. "51 In one sense, this is as it must be, for the Rules are public law, and necessarily do not tell us what to do when we are legally free to choose. But lacking professional or cultural support for ways of thinking about difficult moral issues not subject to mandatory rules, we lawyers are, first, inevitably left "morally alone,"52 to decide as we wiU; more deeply, however, we find ourselves not at all alone, for we are in the dominating company of our clients', our partners •, and our own self-interest, and in the grip of a reigning ideology of profession and culture that tells us that to balk at doing what is lega1ly pennissib1e is very likely an imposition on one's client. 53
In their origins, and in some versions of their practice, the religious traditions are a deep well of guidance for decisionmaking "beyond the Shaff'er,59 that our faith communities, clerics and laity alike, would respond to a request for moral guidance with not much more than sympathy at the difficulty of the question and support for whatever we might come to decide is the right thing to do.
A.BJ. 2(}()3
Shaffer won't let himself, and his "church," off the hook so easily.
AB we will see, the sorts of religiously grounded scruples that lead Shaffer to find aspects of law practice "painful or confusing''60 are not simply the products of the categorical prohibitions expressed in or deduced from his religion. By freeing the processes of communal moral discernment from the coercive influences of an authoritarian religion, and perhaps of the discerning community itself,67 Shaffer makes it possible to open before himself, and lay before us, a more far-reaching set of moral challenges than we ordinarily hold still fo r.
Consider first his responses to questions within the cognizance of the rules or principles of the professional codes:68 l.
Would it be warranted, religiously , fo r me to fo llow professional norms that permit or require me to treat "third parties" that is, everyone other than my client-as outside the orbit of my care and concern, so that:
-having withdrawn from representing a securities registrant fraudulently claiming assets it did not have, I do not disclose the reason 66. In Uelme.n, ReligiOWJ PersOif, supra n. 10, at 1090-1091, Amy Uelmen questions the tendency of many commentators to pose one-dimensional questions of clashes between professi onal norms and flat prohibitions against participating in specific acts, such as abortions, blood tranSfusions, and divorces, neglecting the more far-reaching call of more subtle religious nonns. In Kaveny, OrdintJry Time, supra n. 24, at 181-214, Cathleen Kaveny articulates and contrasts the underlying premises of the conception of time prevalent in law practice (and the broader capitalist culture} with that of the Roman Catholic tradition, describing with particularity the profound influence of that set of implicit premises on lawyers ' stance toward their work life.
In Pailinger, Luthenm Ju:stlce, supra n. 6S, at 665-701, Marie Failinger tests some of the unacknowledged premises of Chief Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence, which she descnbes as "a limited role for the judicial use or reason" (666), "a prcf'c:rence fo r 'order over liberty"' (667), the absence of a "moral cridque available . . . to substantiate the propriety of particular legislation" (667), and "a thorough lack of rhetorical concern fo r the neighbor," (693) against some fundamental principles of Lutheran theology: law as divine gift rather than divino command, a paradoxical affinnation of and deep suspicion of power, and "the premise that neighbor-love is responsive to God's love. -I agree to draft a will fo r my elderly client, leaving his considerable estate to neighbors who "look out fo r his welfare," and totally (albeit lawfully) disinheriting his two adult children and their children? 70 -I agree to draft the papers fo r a grandmother seeking to adopt the infant child of her daughter so that she can qualify fo r an ann ed fo rces training program that will not accept her fo r the program so long as she has custody of a child, where the daughter has consented to the adoption and neither woman seems interested in pursuing instead available temporary shifts in custody?71
2.
Would it be warran ted, religiously, fo r me to fo llow professional norms that require me to subordinate what might be the greater justice of my client's needs to the self-justifying premises of a deeply fl awed political order, so that:
-I cannot allow a client who bas adequate grounds to have his immigration status adj usted, notwithstanding that he has been working here illegally, to answer "none" to a question on the application se eking the name and address of the applicant's employer?72 -I cann ot give or lend money (except fo r court costs) to a client?73
The C01p(Jl'tll e Lawyer 's Obligation to the Public In terest, 33 Bus. Law. 1253, 1257-1258 (1 978).
Ferren finds professional nonns to preclude disclosure, a result tbat he criticizes, but on the ground tbat it permits using fa lse information to "shop for a lawyer." /d. -I should not allow an elderly woman, who has been sharing an apartment with another woman (whom she helps support but fo r whom she cannot claim a tax deduction) and is offered a rent-free apartment over her employer's garage, to exclude the rental value of the apartment from her gross income on the ground that she is living there "for the convenience of the employer''?74
In presenting these cases, I understand Shaffer to be making fo ur assertions:
(I) The public norms reflected in the rules or principles in question rest on political judgments, that is, contestable conclusions about the contours of a just polity. Although law students, and law teachers, act at times (especially in first-year, common-law subj ects) inconsistently with this proposition, I do not regard it as seriously debatable.
(2)
The plausibility of those judgments cannot fo reclose the question whether it is consonant with "God 's will " fo r a la wyer to apply a particular rule to th e injury of a sp ecific person or group of persons affe cted by that act. From a religious orientation, one can support this proposition without debating the relative merits of act-oriented versus rule-oriented approaches to morality. The "proof text" is as fundamental as any can be: "You shall have no other gods before me."15 Binding one's conscience to the positive law is a manifest act of idolatry. 76 (3) In each instance there is reason at least to inquire seriously whether that consonance is lacking. Shaffer this assertion as to any of the above cases; nor will I. My own belief is that, at bottom, one's answer turns on how one understands the biblical admonition to love our neighbor, 71 or how one understands our responsibility fo r one another/8 and how one regards the justice of the prevailing social order. These are momentous matters, happily not directly before me now, and many religious people hear different concerns in the voice of God than Shaffer does, or I do. For one who in any specific instance finds no serious moral problem fo llowing professional nonns-one who does not find the matter "painful or confusing"79 -there is nothing more to be said.
( 4) Th e place to consider the question of lack of consonance is among th e members of the lawyer 's "church ." The call of fa ith is a call to process, carried on in community, without prejudgment or (so fa r as possible) rationalization. "Everyone [is] allowed to speak, and ... everybody else [is] bound to pay attention. "8 0 In no case is Shaffer suggesting that the answer is a quick "yes," that the answer to the question is clear. The question remains whether the ultimate discernment is left to the inquirer or the community. Here Shaffer is implicit at bes� and perhaps a bit in the grip of conflicting premises. He is strongly drawn to the examples of the Apostolic and Refonnation periods, of which it could have been said that "the worshiping community and the deliberating community [were] routinely the same,"81 and some of his language seems to give the discerning community dispositional authority.82 But today such congregations exist only "here and there,"83 and Shaffer responds to his criticisms of contemporary "mainline" 78. Amy Ue1men, seeins the search fo r the common good as the fundamental motivating fo rce of her work, grounds her understanding of that term in the Second Vatican Council's Pastoral Constitution on the Oturc h and the Modem World. Gaudium et Spes : "Every group must take into acc ount the needs and legilimatc aspirations of every other group, and still more of the human fami ly as a whole. " Uelmc:n, Religimu Person, supra n. 10, at 1079. "As aucb," she infers, "the commo n good is that which a person reaches only if it includes as a consequence, the good of the others." /d . 79 [Vol. xvm congregations and denominations, not by reading them out of the fo ld, but by turning to more infonnal groups of "believers" assembled ad hoc.
He may be led as a result to a broader view of the decisional authority of an individual within the community, in which the principal task of the community is not to act as decisionmaker, but to carry on a process in which the discernment of the seeker is guided and facilitated. In any event, where it is the seeker who has constituted the "discerning community," it is he or she who will charge it, with either a more facilitative or a more decisional role. The resulting guidance would be no less genuine and significant fo r its being ultimately less than binding.
In our present culture, many will find in such an allocation of decisional authority too vague and "soft" a re solution, open to idiosyncratic variations and self-justifying rationalization. We must understand, however, that Shaffer is not proposing a rule or standard to be applied post hoc to enable a third party to judge the morality of another's actions by probing the other's hidden motivations though circumstantial evidence adduced in adversarial proceedings. He is rather speaking to the individual fa cing a morally freighted decision. No one but the actor can judge whether he or she has sought honestly to discern and conscientiously to fo llow God's wilJ; perhaps no one at aU can judge whether he or she has done so successfully. 84 The controversy over the viability of a view of religious obligation like Shaffer's bas a parallel in the dispute over the wisdom of the "legalization" of professional ethics in law. Richard Abel remarked two decades ago on the "progressive decline in nonnativity'' of the professional standards, symbolized by the move from terming those stan dards "cano�" then a "code," and then "rules" --dealing with" first, "ethi cs," then "responsibility," and finally "conduct;" 8 5 the decline has only accelerated in the era of the Mo del Rules. To many lawyers today, the notion of a self-imposed obligation is simply an oxymoron; the source of an obligation is definitionally outside the obligor. In standing against that tide, Shaffer speaks from a religious perspective. But the conflict exists within both religious and secular perspectives (even within the same religious tradition), not between them. To many religious people, Shaffer is simply wrong about the means of discerning the Divine Will-to them, the decisions, general or case-specific, of authoritative interpreters of Scriptural and other admonitions of a particular tradition, are the voice of God-while to many others only a narrower position is tenable. 87 This is not the place to debate the question.'8 Suffice it to note that negative characterizations of Shaffer's approach as too subjective or pennissive often reflect unspoken disagreement at a far more fundamental level. Compare what seems to me the far nanowcr view of another esteemed Roman Catholic scholar, Robert Rodes:
[M]any faith traditions recognize some privileged source of religious discernment within their foundation documents, the community of their belicvcn, or the polity of their church. But only a few such traditions claim a broad sweep of privileged moral discernment. In my own tradition, Roman Catholicism. the higher echelons of the polity claim privileged discernment of a few principles of aencral morality that Catholic:
lawyers have to take into acc ount in their practice. Some fai th traditions go farther, but most do not go even as far . Rodes, Agenda, supra n. JO, at 979.
A more f\mdamental divergence from George's view is expressed by Michael Perry , also 
88
. My teacher, Rabbi Marcia Prager, has eloquently articulated a religious consciousness that denies the necess ity of dichotomizing external and internal sources of obligation:
The Uving God speaks to each of us fi'om the inside out, in our own voice. For my soul to recognize God's voice there mllSt be an inner voice l hear, an imperative in the depths of my soul. The word "commandm ent" casts God's voi ce as if it were only a voice of external authority, but our teachcn know that when we truly hear, we hear an inner voice and touch an inner knowing u welt" Marcia Prager, The Path of Bles3ing: Experiencing the Energy and Abundance of the Divin e J 56-J 57 (BelJ Tower 1998). Listening fo r God is my attempt, congruent with this thought, to present a view of religion u "an expression not of a command but of a truth." Lesnick, Li3tening fo r God, 3upril n. 34, at 113 (emphasis deleted). In its fi nal chapter, l suggest a parallel way of looking at legal obligation. /d. at 132-160.
[Vol. XVm
In recent years, perhaps as a result of his direct work with poor people in the legal aid clinic, Shaffer has ratcheted matters up significantly. Going beyond specific acts of attorney blindness to his or her participation in immoral acts, he has powerfully broadened the challenge:
[M]oney is the number-one most serious moral problem fo r American lawyers and their clients . . . . The Rabbis teach that
God is the Creator of prosperity. One who ignores the ob ligation to the poor is an idolator who does not recognize the source of wealth.
The Book of Leviticus . . . says, "You shall not put a stumbling block in the path of the blind." The sages of Judaism decided that the rule does not apply to those who harass blind people as much as it applies to those who misuse the law, who are dishonest, but legal, who, "through perfectly legal transactions," mistreat wlnerable people-my debtor clients .. .. The Rabbis [also] say that those who use the law to protect their wealth are like those who buy from thieves .. .. 89 "Convicted" as he is by this challenge, Shaffer begins by questioning pervasive rath er than particularized choices we make in the practice of law: the fo ndness of lawyers fo r work specializing in service to wealth, the fa ilure of those lawyers who "are able to raise moral standards in business" to make serious efforts to do so, and the pervasive neglect by most lawyers of the ordinary legal needs of ordinary people.90 But he cannot rest easy there. His self-described ''tirade't91 goes on to question lawyers ' relative wealth itself. Moreover, he does not speak only oflarge-finn partners and senior in-house lawyers.92 He challenges himself, and most of us, as well� I do not worry about affording a vacation, or going to the dentist or the movies. 
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NO OTHER GODS situation, not so much in tenns of theory and command as in particular answers being lived out by particular people.93 He finds sobering salience in the stories of ordinary people striving consciously to limit their income and spending, and in the admonitions of the Jewish tradition and its "extensive rabbinic limits-against hoarding [and] temptations to corruption, . .. [its] positive injunctions to generosity, to philanthropy, to spending time with family and in religious study, and to social responsibility. 94 Despite the depth of Shaffer's challenge, recall that he asks people of faith only to listen, to be in his company as he listens to the call of his faith, and then to listen,f aithfully, fo r that of their own. Nonetheless, he has no illusions about the reception his ideas would receive: Serious discussion of them among most Christian and Jewish congregations would, he suggests, be deemed "impertinent and intrusive."95 As I have tried to listen to Shaffer, advertant to what it might mean fo r me to act on a consciousness of my work as "religiously important," I have fo und him about as intrusive and impertinent as their hearers might have fo und Moses, Amos, Isaiah, or Jesus. I can neither dismiss nor fo llow his call. What I can do is, first, acknowledge my abiding gratitude and admiration for his courage in raising with us these unwelcome questions; second, deflect (perhaps only for the moment) that part which most profoundly draws in question the way I live; and, third, raise a set of reservations about some radiations of his approach to moral discernment. 96 I understand Shaffer to be speaking primarily to people who think of themselves as living their lives within a fa ith tradition, but have allowed themselves to fo rget that it is inherent in religion that its moral claims are prior to those of"the world"-" Yo u shall have no other gods bestdes me "-and should not so easily be accommodated to the values of the prevailing social order. Again, this priority is not a result of any argument or rational calculus; to a believer, it is simply a fa ct about the way the world is put together.97 C.S. Lewis put it well: "God is to be 93 I don 't think that Shaffer is admonishing religious skeptics that they should become believers, or even suggesting that they would be better people if they did. Yet, to both "convinced skeptics, and those of us in that borderland between faith and doubt-and here I include myselt'9-it is difficult not to think of the matter as one of the balance of advantage, whether as shallowly as "Pascal's Wager, or in some other: version.100 And so, reading a believer's comparison of ethical discernment from within a community of fa ith with that from outside it, it is easy to think of the believer as asserting some moral superiority of embracing a fa ith tradition.
Unlike many religionists whose triumphalist "testifying, makes such an imputation appropriate,101 I do not place Shaffer in that group .101 Nonetheless, in some ways Shaffer is hard fo r a religious skeptic or "fence·straddler" to read. Even if he is not telling us to mend our erring command, but rather out of an internal conviction about the essence of my nature as a person and tho consequent relationships with God and with others"). To Shaffer, "tho religious tradition ... has not understood itsolf as a philosophy or a preference or a point of view. It bas understood itself as a sequence of fa cts that those in tbo tradition learn to remember." See Shaffer, Te nsion, supra n. 1, at 28 1 02. Shaffer has had critical things to say about what he and others term "American civil religion," into which molt contemporary religious bodies have fit themselves, and which enabl es many to live comfortably in a religious community and fo rgot or disregard tbe priority of religious claims. However, I believe lbat his complaint is that they do not live by their own profess ions.
(Among the works cited in supra n. 2, 0x.ytMro11 has a very brief summary statement of this idea, id. at 13-14).
Ho also speaks critically of the norms of the legal profession, but it would be a mistake to read him as if he were calling for the Rules-drafters, Congress, or the Suprc:mc Court to accommodate those norms to "the call of faith." (I have made a secularly-grounded claim along lbose lines, in Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer. supra n. 3, at 1469-1 493.). He is rather saying how believing lawyers should respond to the "tension" between their beliefs and professional rules and norms; the problem is what the church should do about the government. not what the government should do about the church. Shaffer, AmerictJII Calholics, supra n. 2, at 10.
ways, his words seem to characterize those of us not in the "circle of believers"103 as living a relatively impoverished moral life: We are "captives of an ethic that leaves each of [us] ... morally alone"; we are each our own "moral tyrant" ;104 secular moral thinking, whether grounded in law, reason or experience, "lacks a depth that the religious tradition is able to remember''-the "call to tragedy."105 So perhaps it is defensiveness on my part to suggest, as I now will do, that he too sharply dichotomizes communal and individual discernment, and too narrowly cabins the depth and power of secular rationality as a ground of moral discernment.
Shaffer has written rec ently of prophets, mentors and role models, and invoked, most eloquently, some favorite ones, ancient (Isaiah) and modem (Sr. Joan Chittister).106 I can anchor my objection by recalling one who most assuredly deserves a place among their company, one, indeed, who stands with Moses and Jesus as our three greatest moral teachers .
For Socrates in many ways personified rationalist individualism. When one of his interlocutors sought to justify laughing "instead of refuting" him by noting that he had "put fo rth views nobody would accept," Socrates responded:
[T]ry the kind of refutation I think is called fo r. For I ... produce one witness to whatever rm saying, and that's the man I'm having a discussion with . . . . See if you'll be willing to give me a refutation, then, by answering the questions you're asked.
It's you alone whom I call on for a vo te . . .. 10 7
There is a "community'' of sorts here , but hardly Shafferian-not only because of its strict limitation of size, but more fundamentally becalise of the individualism inherent in the relentlessly rati onal character of the "dialogue." "I am the kind of man," he tells his friend Crito, "who listens only to the argument that on reflection seems best to me,"108 even when what is at stake is his refusal to allow his own life to be saved:
[W]e must examine next whether it is just for me to try to get out of here when the Athenians have not acquitted me. If it is seen to be just, we wiii try to do so; if it is not, we will abandon the idea . . . . If it appears that we shall be acting unj ustly, then we have no need at all to take into account whether we shall have to die if we stay here and keep quiet ... rather than do wrong.1�»
And die he did, taking the cup into his own hand-to those around him "a man who, we would say, was of all those we have known the best, and also the wisest and the most upright,"110 and to us an enduring example of the capacity of reason alone to guide us, not only in discerning the "j ust," but in resisting the most powerful temptation not to act on that discernment:
[A]mong so many arguments this one alone survives refutation and remains steady: that doing what 's unj ust is more to be guarded against than suffering it, and that it's not seeming to be good but being good that a man should take care of more than anything, both in his public and his private life. 11 1 It is true that Socrates' example is enduring in part because of its rarity. But how many true fo llowers of Jesus do any of us know? Yet it does seem to be the case that rationality does not serve a person in moral doubt as well as religious faith, 1 12 not on some empirical ground counting up exemplars and backsliders--b ut because of differences inherent in the two modes of response to morally freighted choice in life.
The "air" of reason tends toward the rarified, that of fa ith toward the saturated. Either may suffocate, but it seems inherently more difficult to enrich the fo rmer than to ameliorate the effects of the latter. 113
Nonetheless, at least some of those to whom Athens speaks in ways that Jerusalem does not deserve a bit of encouragement, which Shaffer's words hardly supply.
Moreover, Shaffer's own fluid notion of the community of "church" counsels recognition that discerning communities may be fo und outside the religious tradition.114 My good friend, Carri e Menkel Meadow, has written wisely as well as movingly about her own odyssey, 115 where first from her parents' experience in the Third Reich, and then from her own in America during the 1960s, she learned that "religious birthrights can be replaced by fo rmative experiences ... that challenge, as well as reinforce, that into which we are born," and that of which Menk:el-Meadow, and many others, have "testified."121 Such communities do not require their membe rs to "assumeD the presence of God in the discussion,"122 but I wonder whether, having accepted as "church" rather casual, ad hoc collections of persons of widely varying religious outlooks, Shaffer can continue to insist so strongly on this requisite. Of course, one can simply regard the assumption of Divine presence as definitional, but the question remains wh ether such a definition bas real salience. In another context, he states the "essentials" fo r membership in the "people of God.
, as "communal quality of belief; local group as the place fo r moral discourse; respect fo r teache rs. "1 n This admirable catalogue applies as well to at least some communities that would not dream of seeking to be accounted "people of God."124 The problem could be resolved by narrowing rather than broadening the concept of "church," to reject Shaffer's acceptance of non-congregational communities of moral discernment . I have referred above to Milner Ball's pertinent observation125 that the lawyer coming to his or her community of faith fo r moral guidance does so profoundly oriented by a prior and ongoing engagement with the practices of that community's fa ith tradition. Shaffer would surely accept the salience of that insight. In coming nonetheless to find genuine "church" among ad hoc groupings of "believers" who differ in the nature and even the existence of their religious affiliations, be is probably led by his acute awareness of the moral fa ilings in the triumphalism of conservative, and the accommodationism of liberal, congregations.
As my speaking of the "quasi-secular'' suggests, I believe that the boundary between the religious and the secular is somewhat more porous than Shaffer's language implies. To me, the core of the religious experience is the encounter with transcendence, the experience of awe in the presence of the infinite, which grounds a palpable sense of wonder, an openness to mystery. 1 2 6 A secular morality typically abides not in wonder but in doubt, viewing mystery as a limitation to be overcome, if possible, by philosophical and scientific inquiry. The sense of "tragedy," which Shaffer notes as a special aspect of the moral equipment of religious people, 127 is kept at bay in much secular thinking.'28 To a substantial extent, then, Shaffer has good grounds fo r speaking as he has.
But there is nothing inherent in secularism, in particular in the rej ection of theistic approaches, that requires the reduction of wonder to clarity. A secular consciousness that hospitably incorporates a sense of awe and wonder has much in common with a similarly oriented religious consciousness.129 Beyond that, individuals have a complexity that resists neat classification.
Philosopher-classicist (now law professor) Martha Nussbaum may provide an example. She speaks of "reverence and awe" fo r the nonns of the moral law as means of committing ourselves to them, as means of deeming them obligations: "We picture them as if they stood outside of us, even though in a sense we are well aware that they stand within us."130 She is moved by Immanuel Kant' s description of the "ever-increasing awe" with which he experiences "the starry sky above me and the moral law within me." It is not that the moral law "is external ;" she reads Kant to deny that explicitly. Rather, "he regards its presence in himself with the same awe with which he views the heavens." To Nu ssbaum, by language of transcendence we "express our wish to be bound" by the moral law, "even when we wish to do otherwise."131 We need not determine whether she belongs to a faith community to appreciate the capacity of her moral discernments to ground decisionmaking.
